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Abstract
I compare the outcome when ￿rms semicollude on advertising to the outcome in the
Grossman and Shapiro (1984) model of informative advertising. I show that advertising
is lower but prices and pro￿ts are higher under semicollusion on advertising. I also show
that semicollusion on advertising is detrimental to welfare. Although ￿rms earn higher
pro￿ts when colluding on advertising, fewer consumers are informed, and as a result,
welfare is lower. Compared to semicollusion on price, semicollusion on advertising is
not always less pro￿table. Hence I lend theoretical support to empirical studies that
￿nd evidence of collusion on advertising rather than price.
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1 Introduction
The importance of advertising as a competitive weapon in sellers￿interactions has long been
recognized. Typically, a ￿rm that advertises more can expect higher demand and hence
higher revenues, other things being equal. In multi￿rm industries, this possibility to steal
customers from competitors often results in costly "advertising wars" as ￿rms try to regain
lost market share. If, in addition, advertising conveys price information, such advertising
wars inadvertently lead to lower prices ￿a double blow!
Indeed, Grossman and Shapiro (1984), Christou and Vettas (2003), among others, show
that increased price advertising raises demand elasticity and thus lowers prices. Hence, ex-
cessive advertising may actually hurt ￿rms. Therefore, if ￿rms are sophisticated, they ought
to realize the folly of unbridled price advertising. Yet, the analysis of price advertising
has been framed exclusively in terms of fully noncooperative interaction. While in many
countries price collusion is per se illegal (which may explain nonprice collusion), collusion
￿This paper is a revised version of Chapter One of my dissertation. I thank Richard Friberg for valuable
comments. I also thank Lars Sorgard, participants of the Lunch Workshop at Stockholm School of Economics
and seminar participants at University of Cape Town for helpful comments and suggestions. Financial
support from Vetenskapsr￿det and the Wallander and Hedelius Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. The
usual disclaimer applies.
1on advertising is not.1 If anything, the existence of advertising agencies ￿that often han-
dle advertising from several competing ￿rms ￿provides scope for collusion on advertising
(Bernheim and Whinston, 1985).2
What is more, empirical evidence (on price and advertising strategies in di⁄erent in-
dustries) seem to support the hypothesis of collusion on advertising. Gasmi et al (1992)
investigate possible market con￿gurations in the Cola market (Nash behaviour, Stackelberg
leadership and several possible con￿gurations of collusion). They use data for the period
1968-1986 to test their hypotheses and thus to select a model of strategic behavior that best
￿ts the data. Noncooperative behaviour in both advertising and prices is rejected by the
data. They ￿nd support for collusion on advertising (but not price). In a similar study, but
for the US butter and margarine industry, Wang et al (2004) reach a similar conclusion. A
related study is that of the US cigarette market by Roberts and Samuelson (1988). They
￿nd that, particularly for low tar cigarettes, the data does not seem to support the hypoth-
esis of combative advertising. Moreover, they cannot reject the hypothesis of joint pro￿t
maximizing choice of advertising.
In this paper, I examine ￿rms￿incentives to collude on advertising when advertising is
purely informative. More precisely, I compare the equilibrium under collusion on advertising
to the fully noncooperative equilibrium as well as to the equilibrium under price collusion.
I also investigate the welfare implications of collusion on advertising.
I adopt the framework of Grossman and Shapiro (1984) and postulate a linear city in
which ￿rms sell a di⁄erentiated product. Consumers are uniformly distributed along the
unit interval and do not search. Firms advertise to inform consumers. I analyze three cases:
no collusion, collusion on advertising only and collusion on price only.3
I ￿nd that, compared to the noncooperative equilibrium outcome, collusion on advertising
leads to reduced advertising but higher prices and pro￿ts. By lowering the advertising
intensity, collusion on advertising raises informational product di⁄erentiation and this relaxes
price competition. This allows the ￿rms to charge higher prices. Also, lower advertising has
a positive direct e⁄ect on pro￿t ￿lower advertising outlay. The lower advertising outlay,
coupled with the induced higher prices, enable ￿rms to earn higher pro￿ts.
Although ￿rms earn higher pro￿ts, semicollusion on advertising is bad for welfare. Con-
sumers not only pay higher prices, rather, in addition to higher prices, fewer consumers
get informed when ￿rms collude on advertising ￿and this exacerbates the loss of consumer
surplus. In comparing price collusion to collusion on advertising, I ￿nd that the former
dominates the latter in terms of revenues. Firms advertise more and charge higher prices
1In the US, the pertinent case is California Dental Association (CDA) vs Federal Trade Commission
(FTC). While the FTC and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals condemned the CDA￿ s advertising restrictions
as per se illegal, the US Supreme Court ruled that it was not "intuitively obvious" that the restrictions were
anticompetitive. Instead, the Court instructed that the restrictions be examined (by the Ninth Circuit)
under the rule of reason ￿where the potential bene￿ts are contrasted to the costs (Lande and Marvel, 2000).
When a particular conduct is deemed per se illegal, the FTC /Court will move directly to the punishment
phase.
2In the US for example, promotion of milk products is cooperatively managed (Blisard, Undated; Lande
and Marvel, 2000).
3I deliberately omit the case of full collusion (collusion on both advertising and prices). It is well under-
stood that the monopoly pro￿t is at least as large as the sum of the duopoly pro￿ts. Therefore, there is
nothing much to be gleaned from studying this case.
2when colluding on price. However, price collusion is not, in general, more pro￿table.
This paper adds to the growing literature on semicollusion. Semicollusion obtains when-
ever economic agents choose to cooperate along some dimension(s) while at the same time
competing along another dimension. The only previous work on semicollusion on advertis-
ing that I am aware of is Aluf and Shy (2001).4 They study comparison advertising in a
duopoly market where products are, in the absence of advertising, homogeneous. In their
model, advertising serves to di⁄erentiate products in the eyes of the consumers (spurious
product di⁄erentiation). They show that semicollusion leads to higher advertising, prices
and pro￿ts relative to the noncooperative outcome.
In an interesting contribution, Fershtman and Gandal (1994) challenge the widely ac-
cepted view that price collusion is always bene￿cial to ￿rms. They argue that semicollusion
can be disadvantageous. In particular, they show that when ￿rms noncooperatively choose
capacity in the ￿rst stage of the game and then collude on price in the second stage, they
earn lower pro￿ts compared to the fully noncooperative outcome. Steen and Słrgard (1999)
adapt the Fershtman and Gandal (1994) model to suit the Norwegian cement market. In
their model, ￿rms can also export excess output at the prevailing world price. They show
that if each ￿rm￿ s domestic market share is determined by the ￿rm￿ s share of total industry
capacity and ￿rms collude on price, a higher domestic demand may induce overinvestment in
capacity and this in turn will lead to an increase in exports. They label this e⁄ect the "semi-
collusion e⁄ect". They empirically test for and ￿nd support for this e⁄ect in the Norwegian
cement cartel.
The paper closest to mine in scope is Aluf and Shy (2001). However, in our frame-
work, unlike Aluf and Shy (2001), advertising does not change consumers￿tastes. That is,
advertising is purely informative. I also di⁄er with them in that I allow for semicollusion
on price. This enables me to make comparisons between semicollusion on advertising and
semicollusion on price.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 sets out the model. I derive the nonco-
operative and the semicollusive equilibria in section 3 and section 4 studies semicollusion
on price. I contrast the equilibrium when ￿rms semicollude on price to the equilibrium
when they semicollude on advertising in section 5. Section 6 discusses the pros and cons of
semicollusion and section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Model and Preliminaries
I adopt Tirole (1988)￿ s model ￿a simpli￿cation of the Grossman and Shapiro (1984) model
of informative advertising with di⁄erentiated products. Two ￿rms, ￿rm 1 and ￿rm 2; sell
a horizontally di⁄erentiated good. The ￿rms are located at the end points of a linear city
of unit length with ￿rm 1 located at point 0 and ￿rm 2 at point 1. Firms randomly send
out advertisements (ads) to inform consumers of the prices they charge. That is, every
4The literature has focused on situations where ￿rms cooperate on price while at the same time competing
on some other variable ￿for example capacity (Steen and Słrgard, 1999), (Fershtman and Gandal, 1994);
R&D (Fershtman and Gandal, 1994); location (Friedman and Thisse, 1993). See also Steen and Słrgard,
(1999; footnote 1).
3consumer has an equal chance of receiving any ad that is sent by any ￿rm. Let ￿i denote
the advertising intensity of ￿rm i;i = 1;2 (fraction of the consumer population that is
exposed, at least once, to the advertising message of ￿rm i). The cost of reaching fraction
￿i of consumers is denoted A(￿i); where A(￿) = a￿
2=2;a > t=2:5 Each good is produced
at a constant marginal cost which I normalize to zero. There is no entry or exit.
Consumers are uniformly distributed according to taste on [0,1], have unit demands
and attach a dollar value of v to the consumption of a unit of the good. Consumers are
uninformed about prices and ￿rm locations unless they are reached by advertising. Thus, un-
informed consumers do not participate in the market. Informed consumers incur a shopping
cost of t per unit of distance travelled.6
Given the ￿rms￿advertising intensities, ￿1 and ￿2; and the consumers￿(passive) behavior,
the market is delineated as follows; fraction ￿1￿2 of consumers receive advertising messages




;i;j = 1;2;j 6= i receive ads from ￿rm i
but not ￿rm j (partially informed); and fraction (1 ￿ ￿1)(1 ￿ ￿2) receive no ads from either
￿rm (uninformed). I assume that ￿1￿2 is large enough so that ￿rms ￿nd it worthwhile to
compete for the fully informed consumers.7
Fully informed consumers purchase from whichever ￿rm guarantees them the greatest
surplus. A consumer located at x 2 (0;1) gets surplus v ￿ p1 ￿ tx buying from ￿rm 1 and
surplus v￿p2￿t(1 ￿ x) buying from ￿rm 2. Let b x denote the location of the consumer who
is indi⁄erent between buying from ￿rm 1 and buying from ￿rm 2; then, b x = (p2 ￿ p1 + t)=2t:
Consumers with locations x 2 [0; b x) buy from ￿rm 1 while those with locations x 2 (b x;1]
buy from ￿rm 2: Thus, ￿rm i faces the demand Di
full = (pj ￿ pi + t)=2t from the fully
informed consumers.
For partially informed consumers, demand is determined by individual rationality. Let xi
denote the location of the consumer who receives advertising only from ￿rm i. Buying from
￿rm i yields surplus v ￿pi ￿txi while the consumer gets surplus zero when not purchasing.
Hence the demand from partially informed consumers is given by xi =
v￿pi
t : All partially
informed consumers with locations less than xi ￿nd it worthwhile to purchase while those
with locations greater than xi will not purchase. However, if v ￿ pi ￿ t; all consumers who
receive at least one ad from ￿rm i will make a purchase, that is, xi = 1:
Thus, each ￿rm￿ s demand is a sum of the demands by the partially informed and the
fully informed consumers. That is;
Di (￿1;￿2;p1;p2) = ￿i
￿￿
1 ￿ ￿j
￿ v ￿ pi
t
+ ￿j




In the sequel, I assume that the market is fully covered. For the market to be fully
covered, it is necessary and su¢ cient that the partially informed consumer who travels the
5I assume a > t=2 to allow for some consumers to be uninformed in equilibrium, so that it is possible
to study the e⁄ects of varying the advertising level. For a ￿ t=2; the advertising cost is too low and, as a
result, we have full information in equilibrium. That is, ￿1 = ￿2 = 1: See also Tirole (1988; p. 292).
6Since consumers are distributed according to taste, t can also be interpreted as the disutility from
consuming a good that is di⁄erent from the ideal.
7A necessary condition for ￿rms to compete for the fully informed consumers is that advertising costs are
low. In an appendix available from the author, I derive the exact conditions on the advertising cost, a:
4entire unit distance gets nonnegative surplus. That is, p + t ￿ v:8
With this assumption, the demand facing ￿rm i reduces to:
(1) Di (￿1;￿2;p1;p2) = ￿i
￿
1 ￿ ￿j + ￿j




3 Competition or Collusion?
In subsections 3.1 and 3.2 I derive, respectively, the noncooperative and the semicollusive
equilibria and contrast them in subsection 3.3.
3.1 Noncooperative Equilibrium
Firms simultaneously and noncooperatively choose both advertising levels and prices (Nash
equilibrium). Firm i has the following maximization problem:
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Equation (4) equates the marginal revenue and the marginal cost of raising the adver-
tising reach marginally.





It is immediate from (5) that higher advertising is associated with lower prices. This is
explained by the fact that when the market is covered, fully informed consumers are price
sensitive while partially informed consumers are not. A higher advertising intensity implies
a higher proportion of fully informed consumers in the market and this puts pressure on
prices.
Substituting (5) back into the objective function yields,








as the ￿rm￿ s pro￿t for any given level of advertising. One can easily show that;
8Full market coverage does not require all consumers to make a purchase but rather, it only requires that
all informed consumers make a purchase.
5Lemma 1 Pro￿ts are strictly decreasing in the advertising intensity.
Proof. @￿=@￿ = (￿ ￿ 2)t ￿ a￿ < 0:
To understand why pro￿ts decrease with advertising at all levels, we write the pro￿t
function as: ￿ = R(￿) ￿ C (￿); where the revenue, R(￿) = 2t ￿ 2t￿ + t￿
2=2 and the
cost, C (￿) = a￿
2=2: Di⁄erentiating the revenue and cost functions with respect to ￿ gives;
R0 (￿) = (￿ ￿ 2)t < 0 and respectively, C0 (￿) = a￿ > 0: That is, a small increase in
advertising lowers the ￿rm￿ s revenues but raises the ￿rm￿ s costs. Although demand increases
with advertising, the negative e⁄ect on price of an increase in ￿ dominates the total e⁄ect on
revenues. Since revenues fall while costs rise with advertising, it follows that pro￿t decreases
with increases in advertising.











and substituting (7) back into the objective function gives






where nc is a mnemonic for noncooperative.
3.2 Semicollusion
In this section, I study a two period game where ￿rms collude on advertising but compete
on prices. The timing of the game is as follows: In the ￿rst stage, ￿rms noncooperatively
set their prices, and in the second stage, knowing the equilibrium prices chosen in the ￿rst
stage, they collusively decide on advertising.
Our timing needs some dressing. Although the standard approach in the literature is to
let ￿rms set the less ￿ exible variable in the ￿rst stage and then set the more ￿ exible choice
variable (typically prices) in the second stage (see for example, Aluf and Shy, 2001; Salvanes
et al, 2003), our timing is not without merit. In the case of print advertising, our timing
is natural. When ￿rms advertise their prices, they need to know the prices before they can
print them and send out the ￿ iers. That is, ￿rms choose prices ￿rst.
To bring more realism to this game, we can recast the game as follows: ￿rms noncooper-
atively choose their prices while delegating the decision on advertising to a third party ￿the
advertising agency.9 In the ￿rst stage, ￿rms set prices and in the second stage, knowing the
prices chosen by the ￿rms in the ￿rst period, the advertising agency chooses the advertising
level to maximize ￿rms￿joint pro￿ts.
9Bernheim and Whinston (1985) show that indeed the use of common marketing agents facilitates collu-
sion. The role of advertising agencies include market analysis, media buying services, consultation on pro-
motion strategies and techniques (design and packaging) among others (Printadvertising.com; Utah Firms
Sta⁄, 2003). Many ￿rms nowadays employ advertising agencies to do the advertising on their behalf. For
example, EURO RSCG Worldwide has, among its clients, Volvo, Citroen and Peugeot ￿ ￿rms competing
in the same market! Catalpha Advertising and Design has among its clients; Black & Decker, DeWalt,
Craftsman ￿￿rms selling similar products.
6Introducing an agency into the game potentially creates an agency problem. A question
that arises is whether the advertising agency will have incentives to act in the interest of the
￿rms. However, it is not di¢ cult to see that, in the present setting, compensation (incentive)
schemes can be easily designed to induce the agency to act in the joint interest of the ￿rms.
For example, to align the agency and the ￿rms￿incentives, one can imagine Nash bargaining
over the total industry pro￿ts between the agency and the ￿rms, or, the agency can be paid
a commission (as in Bernheim and Whinston, 1985) that is a ￿xed proportion of each ￿rm￿ s
pro￿t. Because higher advertising results in lower pro￿t, in either case the agency will have
incentives to reduce advertising. However, to simplify the analysis, I will assume that the
advertising agency gets no share of the pro￿ts.
As is typical in two stage games, I solve the problem backwards, starting with the
collusive phase.
3.2.1 Collusion phase
In the collusive phase, the advertising agency sets ￿1 = ￿2 = ￿; knowing the equilibrium
prices, p1 and p2; chosen by the ￿rms in the prior (noncooperative) phase.10 The agency
maximizes the following objective function:
(9)
Q
￿ ￿1 + ￿2 = max
￿
￿












The ￿rst order condition yields
(10) ￿ =
t(p1 + p2)
2at + t(p1 + p2) + (p1 ￿ p2)
2:
3.2.2 Competition phase
In the competition phase, ￿rms noncooperatively set their prices, knowing that they will
collude on advertising afterwards. Given the collusive advertising level in (10), ￿rm i￿ s
problem is described by:
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Di⁄erentiating with respect to pi; and solving for a symmetric equilibrium gives:
(12) pac = t=2 +
p
2at + t2=4:










10We assume that side payments are not feasible. Hence, ￿1 = ￿2 in the collusive equilibrium.













where ac is a mnemonic for collusion on advertising.
The full coverage assumption implies that pac = t=2+
p
2at + t2=4 ￿ v￿t: For given t and
v; simplifying gives a ￿ a ￿
(v￿2t)(v￿t)
2t ; where a is the highest advertising cost compatible
with full market coverage.
3.3 Comparison
The question I seek to address here is the following: Does collusion on advertising and
competition on price entail higher or lower prices; higher or lower advertising intensities;
higher or lower pro￿ts compared to the noncooperative outcome? Comparing equations
(7) and (12), it is immediate that pac > pnc: That is, equilibrium prices are higher under
collusion on advertising. Also, from (7) and (13), I get (after a bit of algebraic manipulation)
that ￿
ac < ￿
nc: Since higher advertising has a negative direct e⁄ect on pro￿t, collusion on
advertising unambiguously raises pro￿ts relative to the noncooperative outcome.11
The discussion following Lemma 1 gives a concise statement of why ￿rms may want to
constrain informative advertising. The mechanism works as follows; Consumers who receive
advertising from both ￿rms (fully informed) can make across ￿rm price comparisons and, as
a result, they buy from the ￿rm quoting the lowest "delivered" price. Competition to sell to
these consumers drives the price down. In contrast, consumers who receive advertising from
a single ￿rm only (partially informed) are totally price insensitive (for all prices p ￿ v ￿ t).
Hence, the optimal price applicable to this group is higher compared to that applicable to
the fully informed group. Intuitively, because an increase in advertising raises the proportion
of fully informed consumers in the market, it elevates the importance of the fully informed
consumers and this puts pressure on prices and by Lemma 1, lowers pro￿ts. The idea of
collusion on advertising is precisely to try to minimize such competition by constraining the
proportion of fully informed consumers. To summarize;
Proposition 1 Collusion on advertising (and competition on price) gives lower equilibrium
advertising but higher equilibrium prices and pro￿ts relative to the fully noncooperative equi-
librium. That is, ￿
ac < ￿
nc; pac > pnc and ￿ac > ￿nc:
Proof. (See Appendix A).
Given that price ￿xing is per se illegal, the fact that it is possible to sustain higher prices
and pro￿ts without resorting to price ￿xing should be comforting for ￿rms. Collusion on
advertising is di¢ cult to detect and /or prosecute (unlike price collusion).12 As a matter of
11More precisely, since ￿ac < ￿nc and @￿
@￿ < 0 (Lemma 1), it follows that ￿ac > ￿nc:
12When the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concurred that the CDA code of conduct was a "naked"
restraint on price competition, the Commission thought they had nailed the CDA. However, on appeal, the
Supreme Court instructed that the rules be examined under the rule of reason. Upon reconsideration, the
8fact, advertising agencies openly handle business on behalf of competing ￿rms (see footnote
9, see also Bernheim and Whinston, p. 269).
From a welfare perspective, an important question is whether semicollusion on adver-
tising improves welfare. Grossman and Shapiro (1984), Hamilton (2004) and Simbanegavi
(2005) show that the market may overprovide informative advertising relative to the socially
optimal level. Hence collusion on advertising, by restricting advertising, is potentially wel-
fare improving, especially for low advertising costs. On the one hand, when ￿rms collude
on advertising, fewer consumers get informed and this lowers aggregate consumer surplus
since uninformed consumers do not purchase. On the other hand, because prices are higher
and because ￿rms advertise less when colluding on advertising, they earn higher pro￿ts. So,
which direction will the welfare e⁄ect go? The following Proposition answers this question:
Proposition 2 Semicollusion on advertising is detrimental to welfare.
Intuitively, when ￿rms collude on advertising, they restrict advertising "too much". In
fact, it can be shown that for all advertising costs in the relevant range, the collusive level is
lower than the socially optimal level. That welfare in the semicollusive equilibrium is lower
than in the Nash equilibrium is an important result, particularly for competition policy.
Although ￿rms may overprovide informative advertising in the noncooperative equilibrium
(particularly for low advertising costs), uncontrolled collusion is not a remedy. It is even
more ine¢ cient. Under collusion on advertising, the collusive advertising level is "too low"
and as a result, too few consumers are informed. This exacerbates the loss of consumer
surplus. Since ￿rms have incentives to collude on advertising, there is clearly need for
monitoring.13
Although in the present model, just as in Aluf and Shy (2001), ￿rms charge higher
prices and earn higher pro￿ts when colluding on advertising, there are signi￿cant di⁄erences
between the two models. First, in our framework, ￿rms advertise less when colluding.
Second, the mechanism through which advertising a⁄ects prices and pro￿ts is di⁄erent. In
my model, advertising does not change consumers￿tastes. Instead, it a⁄ects informational
product di⁄erentiation and hence the toughness of price competition. That is, it alters
the proportion of fully informed consumers in the market and hence the price elasticity of
demand.
In what follows, I contrast price collusion to collusion on advertising. This is motivated
by the fact that the analysis of semicollusion to date has largely been framed as collusion
on price and competition on a nonprice variable. The question I address is the following:
Does price collusion lead to higher pro￿ts compared to nonprice collusion ￿in particular, to
collusion on advertising?
decision of the Ninth Circuit was least expected. The Court concluded that there was not enough evidence
to show that the said restrictions were indeed anticompetitive (Lande and Marvel, 2000; pages 956-957).
13This conclusion may not be very robust to variations in the models. For example, in a model in which TV
channels sell advertising time to ￿rms, Kind et al (2005) ￿nd that when TV channels collude on advertising,
equilibrium advertising levels are higher and the TV channels earn higher pro￿ts than when they compete
on advertising.
94 Price Collusion
For ￿rms with multiple strategic variables, semicollusion on price may trigger more com-
petitive behaviour in other choice variables (Fershtman and Gandal, 1994). I consider here
a setting where ￿rms cooperatively set the price at which their merchandise will be sold.
However, each ￿rm independently decides on the "measure" of ￿ iers to send out to con-
sumers. I derive the price collusion equilibrium and compare it to the advertising collusion
equilibrium derived earlier.
As before, I model the ￿rms￿behaviour as a two stage game. In the ￿rst stage, ￿rms
collude on price and in the second stage, ￿rms compete on advertising.
When ￿rms collude on price, ￿rm i￿ s demand is given by:








A peculiar feature of our model is that when ￿rms collude on price, demand is inde-
pendent of price. This independence is a direct consequence of the full market coverage
assumption. Because the market is fully covered, the demand by partially informed con-
sumers is independent of price. Prices only matter for the partitioning of the fully informed
segment of the market (see equation 1). Therefore, when ￿rms collude on price, they divide
the fully informed consumer population equally between them ￿independent of the price.
I solve the problem backwards, starting with the second stage. Given the collusive price,




























In the ￿rst period, anticipating competition on advertising in the second period, ￿rms
collude on price. Given full market coverage, there is a unique focal price. Let ppc be the
collusive price, where pc is a mnemonic for price collusion. Then:
Lemma 2 ppc = v ￿ t:
Proof. I prove by contradiction. Let ppc be the pro￿t maximizing collusive price and
suppose ppc 6= v￿t: Then, either ppc < v￿t or ppc > v￿t: First, suppose ppc < v￿t: Then
(by continuity of price), 9" > 0 : ppc+" < v￿t and ￿ ( ppc + ";￿) > ￿ ( ppc;￿): Hence, any
collusive price, ppc : ppc < v ￿t cannot be pro￿t maximizing ￿a contradiction.14 Therefore,
we must have ppc > v￿t: However, observe that ppc > v￿t violates the full market coverage
assumption ￿a contradiction. Hence, it must be the case that ppc = v ￿ t:
14Raising the price to p = ppc+" < v￿t; does not violate any consumer￿ s individual rationality constraint
￿hence demand is unchanged.




1 if a ￿ v￿t
2
2(v￿t)









(2a+v￿t)2 if a > v￿t
2
:
We see from (18) that price collusion gives rise to a full information equilibrium for lower
levels of the advertising cost while it gives rise to a partial information equilibrium for higher
levels of the advertising cost. Because the price is given (price is una⁄ected by advertising),
each ￿rm wants to inform as many consumers as possible (demand e⁄ect). When a is small
relative to price, it pays to inform all consumers. However, when a increases beyond v￿t
2 ; the
advertising outlay becomes large relative to the revenues and the ￿rm responds by reducing
the advertising intensity.
5 Collusion on Price or Advertising?
Below I relate the price collusion equilibrium to the advertising collusion equilibrium. The
￿rst result in this section comes from comparing the equilibrium prices and advertising
intensities under the two collusive regimes.







: Compared to semicollusion on advertising, the
equilibrium price and advertising intensity are higher under semicollusion on price. That is,
pac < ppc and ￿
ac < ￿
pc:
Proof. By full market coverage, p+t ￿ v: Therefore from (12), we must have that pac+t =
t=2 +
p
2at + t2=4 + t ￿ v: For given t and v; I can solve for a to get; a ￿
(v￿2t)(v￿t)
2t = a:















; pac = t=2 +
p
2at + t2=4 < v ￿ t = ppc as
required. The proof of the second claim (that ￿
ac < ￿
pc) is given in Appendix A.
First, note that ppc = v ￿ t is the highest possible price consistent with full market
coverage. Secondly, as I argued in Proposition 1, collusion on advertising is a "proxy" for
collusion on price. Being an indirect way of colluding on price, it is sensible that pac < ppc:
That ￿
ac < ￿
pc is intuitive. First, advertising is important in this model in that it
raises demand. Hence, other things being equal, ￿rms always want to increase advertising.
Second, when ￿rms collude on price, the negative relationship between price and advertising
is broken. Clearly therefore, when ￿rms collude on price, they have greater incentives to
advertise than when they collude on advertising. It follows therefore that price collusion
induces more advertising.
Since both the price and the advertising level are higher under price collusion, it follows
immediately from Proposition 3 that:
Corollary 1 Revenues and advertising outlays are higher when ￿rms collude on price.
Proof. Let R denote revenues and D denote the demand. At equilibrium, @D
@￿ = 1￿￿ > 0:
That is, demand is increasing in the advertising intensity. Since ppc > pac and ￿
pc > ￿
ac;
11it follows that Rpc ￿ ppcDpc > ppcDac > pacDac ￿ Rac ￿where the ￿rst inequality follows
from the fact that ￿
pc > ￿
ac and @D
@￿ > 0 and the second inequality follows from the fact that
ppc > pac: That the advertising outlay is higher under price collusion follows from convexity
of the advertising cost function (and the fact that ￿
pc > ￿
ac).
A closer look at Propositions 1 and 3 brings to the fore an important di⁄erence between
price and nonprice collusion. Price collusion exacerbates competition on the variable that
is chosen noncooperatively (see also Fershtman and Gandal, 1994 and Steen and Słrgard,
1999). In contrast, nonprice collusion (collusion on advertising or capacity) does not in-
tensify price competition. If anything, it relaxes price competition. In other words, the
"semicollusion e⁄ect" (the competition intensifying e⁄ect of semicollusion) only kicks in un-
der price collusion. To help explain this observation, I invoke Fudenberg and Tirole (1984)￿ s
"taxonomy of business strategies".
As I have shown, when ￿rms collude on advertising, they advertise less. By voluntar-
ily restricting its advertising, each ￿rm signals that it will not be aggressive in the price
competition game. This is so because, with low advertising, fewer consumers are informed
and with fewer informed consumers, demand is low. Hence pro￿ts can only be enhanced
by charging a higher (and not a lower) price. Because prices are strategic compliments,
collusion on advertising softens the rival ￿rm￿ s pricing behaviour15. In this sense, collusion
on advertising is a "puppy dog" strategy.
In contrast, collusion on price induces more aggressive behaviour in the advertising com-
petition game. Because prices are ￿xed, the larger the demand that a ￿rm can generate, the
higher the revenues it expects to get. However, since the price is ￿xed, demand can only be
increased by informing more consumers ￿since uninformed consumers do not purchase. In
this sense, price collusion makes each ￿rm tough in the advertising game16. In the animal
jargon of Fudenberg and Tirole (1984), price collusion is a "top dog" strategy.
The use of the animal terminology here needs to be quali￿ed. Fudenberg and Tirole
(1984) use the animal jargon in a setting in which ￿rms move sequentially, with the ￿rst
mover committing to a particular action, an action which is observed by the follower ￿rm
prior to making its own move. In our setting however, ￿rms move simultaneously (rather
than sequentially) at each stage, but still the commitment issue comes into play since ￿rms￿
second period choices will only be made after both ￿rms observe the ￿rst period choices.17
From the present analysis, together with the analyses of Fershtman and Gandal (1994)
and Steen and Słrgard (1999), it appears that the semicollusion e⁄ect can be explained by
whether the collusion and competition instruments are strategic complements or substitutes.
When ￿rms collude on a strategic substitute (advertising or capacity/quantity) and compete
on a strategic compliment (price), competition is relaxed. However, when ￿rms collude
15From the ￿rst order conditions (see equation (3)), pi =
￿
2t ￿ t￿j + ￿jpj
￿
=2￿j and @pi=@pj > 0:
16Though not apparent, the ￿rms￿ advertising intensities are strategic substitutes. From (4), ￿i =
pi
￿
2t + (pj ￿ pi ￿ t)￿j
￿
=2at: In any equilibrium in which ￿rms compete for the fully informed consumers,
it must be the case that for i;j = 1;2;j 6= i; pj < pi +t: For if pj > pi +t; then all fully informed consumers
will buy from ￿rm i ￿violating the assumption that ￿rms compete for the fully informed consumers. Hence,
@￿i=@￿j = pi (pj ￿ pi ￿ t)=2at < 0:
17The commitment argument is made "as if" ￿rms set advertising in the ￿rst stage. The premise for
this argument is that the ￿rms￿ expectations are ful￿lled along the equilibrium path and therefore, the
expectation to collude in the second stage already conditions behaviour in the ￿rst stage.
12on a strategic compliment (price) and compete on a strategic substitute (advertising or
capacity/quantity), competition is exacerbated. I therefore conjecture that a necessary
condition for the semicollusion e⁄ect to kick in is that the competition variable is a strategic
substitute.
The observation that price collusion intensi￿es competition on the nonprice variable
but not the other way round has important implications for ￿rm conduct. If ￿rms are
"sophisticated" and have multiple choice variables, they ought to realize that price collusion
is more likely to hurt them compared to nonprice collusion. Moreover, price collusion is per
se illegal and is heavily punished for when discovered. This suggests then that ￿rms ought to
shift focus from price to nonprice collusion. They seem to. There is an increasing number of
nonprice collusion cases that the US Federal Trade Commission has had to deal with in recent
years. Examples include; the California Dental Association case in which the association
instituted rules and regulations that restrict price and quality advertising (FTC Docket No.
9259); the Arizona Automobile Dealers Association case in which the association agreed
with some of its members to "restrain truthful and nondeceptive advertising" (FTC File
No. 931 0056); collusion on advertising by PolyGram (predecessor to Vivendi Universal)
and Warner in order to reduce intrabrand competition ￿competition between the Three
Tenors￿third album and video and the ￿rst and second albums and video (FTC File No.
001 0231; Goldberg, 2005).
To recapitulate, the main question I address in this section is the following: If they had
a choice, which strategic variable (price or advertising) would ￿rms use as the collusion
instrument? To answer this question, I compare ￿ac and ￿pc: As a prelude, it is instructive
to analyze the relationship between pro￿ts and the advertising cost, a, under semicollusion
on price and respectively, advertising. Di⁄erentiating equations (14) and (18) with respect
to a; I ￿nd that:
Lemma 3 Semicollusive pro￿ts are decreasing (increasing) in the advertising cost under
price (advertising) collusion.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Under both collusion on price and collusion on advertising, the e⁄ect of an increase in the
advertising cost on pro￿t can be decomposed into a direct e⁄ect and an indirect e⁄ect. Notice
that the advertising cost, a; enters directly into the advertising cost function but only enters
into the revenue function indirectly ￿via price and /or advertising level (see equations (9)
and (16)). The direct e⁄ect of an increase in a is to raise the advertising outlay, other things
being equal. However, other things will not remain equal. An increase in a induces ￿rms
to reduce advertising and this increases informational product di⁄erentiation ￿a strategic
e⁄ect.
Under collusion on advertising, this strategic e⁄ect allows ￿rms to raise prices and con-
sequently revenues. The e⁄ect on revenues outweighs the direct e⁄ect on the advertising
outlay and hence pro￿ts increase with the advertising cost.
Under semicollusion on price, there are two cases to consider. First, when a ￿ (v ￿ t)=2;
we have full information (that is, ￿
pc = 1). Moreover, since ppc = v ￿ t; it follows that the
13revenue function is independent of a. Therefore, when a increases, the only component of the
pro￿t function that changes is the advertising outlay (which increases with a). Hence, for a ￿
(v ￿ t)=2; pro￿t necessarily decreases with a: For a > (v ￿ t)=2; ￿
pc =
2(v￿t)
2a+v￿t < 1 and, when
the advertising cost increases, ￿rms respond by advertising less. Although informational
product di⁄erentiation increases, prices cannot be increased and hence revenues must of
necessity decrease. Since the direct e⁄ect of an increase in a is to raise the advertising
outlay, pro￿ts fall when the advertising cost, a; increases.
Following Lemma 3, one may conjecture that there exists an a; (call it b a) for which the
two pro￿t functions intersect. If indeed such an a exits, then, for a < b a; semicollusion on
price should yield higher pro￿ts while for a > b a; semicollusion on advertising should yield
higher pro￿ts.
Let ￿ denote the ratio of transportation costs to the gross surplus, that is, ￿ ￿ t=v.
Below I plot ￿ac and ￿pc as functions of a; for ￿ = 0:25: From Figure 1, we see that for
"low" values of a; ￿ac (a) < ￿pc (a) while the opposite is true for "high" values of a: In fact,
it can be shown that, for a wide range of the parameter ￿; ￿ac and ￿pc intersect. Below I
state the main result of this section;
Proposition 4 Semicollusion on price does not always lead to higher pro￿ts compared to







v and let b a ￿ a(￿)





; ￿ > 0; ￿pc (a) > ￿ac (a) for a < b a
and ￿pc (a) < ￿ac (a) for a > b a:
Proof. See Appendix A.
Although price collusion dominates collusion on advertising in terms of revenues (Corol-
lary 1), it is, in general, not superior to the latter. As was shown in Proposition 3, ￿rms
14advertise rather "excessively" when they collude on price (which increases demand and
hence revenues). However, because the advertising cost function is convex, the ￿rms incur
higher advertising costs under price collusion (bad for pro￿ts). When the advertising cost is
low, the revenue e⁄ect dominates in the pro￿t function and this makes price collusion more
pro￿table. However, for higher advertising costs, the revenue e⁄ect is weakened by the bal-
looning advertising outlays. Because ￿rms advertise less when they collude on advertising,
they incur lower advertising outlays. As a result, collusion on advertising yields higher prof-
its compared to price collusion when the advertising cost is higher. In summary, collusion
on price is not always more pro￿table compared to collusion on advertising. Depending on
parameter values, sometimes price collusion dominates and sometimes it is dominated.
A principal assumption of this paper is that equilibrium prices are such that the market
is fully covered. One might wonder what the e⁄ect of assuming full coverage is on pro￿ts,
particularly under semicollusion on price. As I have presented it, Proposition 4 is predicated
on the assumption that the market is covered. However, it is quite reasonable to conjecture
that when ￿rms collude on price, the optimal price may be such that some consumers
￿nd it pro￿table not to purchase. If this is the case, then, by assuming full coverage, I
restrict the collusive pro￿ts under semicollusion on price, ￿pc: Thus, it is imperative that
I undertake a robustness check to see to what extent Proposition 4 depends on the full
coverage assumption. I solve this exercise in Appendix B.
I show that although indeed there exist some pro￿table collusive prices for which the
market will not be covered, qualitatively, Proposition 4 is unaltered. The unrestricted
collusive price (and hence the associated unrestricted pro￿t) exceeds the restricted collusive
price (and hence the associated restricted pro￿t) only for a "narrow" range of the advertising
cost, a. For the most part, the restricted pro￿ts are higher! More importantly, in terms of
comparisons with pro￿ts under semicollusion on advertising, ￿ac; allowing for some prices
that lead to less than full coverage is of no consequence. For reasonable parameter values,
￿pc and ￿ac intersect, with ￿ac intersecting ￿pc from below ￿which establishes the result.
The main ￿ndings thus far are that (i) collusion on advertising and competition on price
is more pro￿table than competition on both price and advertising and (ii) collusion on price
does not always lead to higher pro￿ts compared to collusion on advertising. Empirical
evidence seem to support both our ￿ndings. As stated in the introduction, studies of price
and advertising strategies ￿nd support for collusion on advertising but not price, which is
supportive of my ￿ndings18.
6 Is Semicollusion Disadvantageous?
Fershtman and Gandal (1994) argue that semicollusion typically induces intense competition
on the choice variable(s) chosen noncooperatively. If the competitive pressure is su¢ ciently
intense, semicollusion results in lower pro￿ts compared to the fully noncooperative outcome.
Does this thesis hold in our framework?
18The empirical evedence on this issue, however, is mixed. For example, Kadiyali (1996) ￿nd evidence
supportive of collusion on both prices and advertising while Slade (1995) ￿nd evidence of competition on
advertising and collusion on prices.
15To answer this question, I compare the noncooperative pro￿ts to the collusive pro￿ts.
Speci￿cally, I compare ￿nc and ￿ac on the one hand and ￿nc and ￿pc on the other. I ￿nd
that;
Proposition 5 Semicollusion (price/advertising) yields higher equilibrium pro￿ts than when
￿rms compete in both price and advertising.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 5 supports the conventional wisdom that, overall, ￿rms are better o⁄collud-
ing rather than competing. A question that arises is: Why is semicollusion disadvantageous
in the models of Fershtman and Gandal (1994), but not in the present model? In Fershtman
and Gandal (1994), when ￿rms collude on price, they overinvest in capacity hoping to use
the excess capacity as a bargaining chip in the division of the collusive pro￿ts. However,
in equilibrium, excess capacity is totally redundant.19;20 Since capacity is costly to install,
price collusion may hurt ￿rms compared to fully noncooperative interaction.
Unlike capacity, advertising has a positive direct e⁄ect for the advertising ￿rm ￿ it
raises demand. In fact, the reason for "excessive" advertising (under price collusion) is
to increase demand. Thus, even though advertising (just like capacity) is costly, it is not
totally redundant. This demand expansion e⁄ect mitigates the negative e⁄ect of higher
advertising intensities. Hence, notwithstanding the fact that ￿rms advertise excessively
under price collusion, they still earn higher pro￿ts compared to competition on both price
and advertising.
7 Conclusion
I analyze ￿rms￿incentives to collude on advertising when advertising is purely informative.
I ￿nd that semicollusion on advertising is more pro￿table than competition on both price
and advertising. From a welfare perspective, collusion on advertising is bad. When ￿rms
collude on advertising, "too few" consumers are informed and, as a result, welfare is lower
than when ￿rms compete on both prices and advertising. This result is important for policy.
Although advertising is only informative, there is need for monitoring ￿more so with the
advent of advertising agencies. Left unchecked, ￿rms will be tempted to connive against
consumers.
I also compare price collusion to collusion on advertising. In general, price collusion
does not dominate collusion on advertising. In this sense, there is no justi￿cation for the
theoretical literature￿ s exclusive focus on price collusion. Hence I lend theoretical support
to the empirical literature that largely ￿nd evidence of collusion on advertising rather than
on price.
In this paper, I use a static model to study ￿rms￿incentives to collude on advertising.
But, will the ￿rms actually collude on advertising? To answer this question, we need a
19In a symmetric equilibrium, both ￿rms overinvest to the same extend ￿hence the excess capacity will
not in any way enhance a particular ￿rm￿ s bargaining position.
20The same mechanism also operates in Steen and Słrgard (1999) to induce overinvestment in capacity.
However, the export market provides a leeway that reduces the redundancy of excess capacity.
16dynamic/ repeated setting which permits ￿rms to respond to the actions of competitors.
Collusion on advertising is sustainable only if the incentives to deviate are outweighed by
the bene￿ts from conforming. This, however, is left for future research.
17Appendix
Appendix A: Proofs of Lemmas and Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Proposition 1 states that ￿
nc > ￿






2at + t2=4 = pac: By Lemma 1, @￿=@￿ < 0: Therefore, if
￿
ac < ￿



































: To show that ￿
ac < ￿






























































2at + t2=4 < 2at+
































08a: I conclude that ￿
nc > ￿







Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Let Wac (CSac) be the welfare (consumer surplus) when ￿rms collude on advertising
but compete on prices and Wnc (CSnc) be the welfare (consumer surplus) when ￿rms
compete on both prices and advertising. Because the market is covered, CS = v ￿ p:
De￿ning welfare as pro￿ts plus consumer surplus (W = ￿ + CS), I get that




















































Subtracting the latter from the former gives































I conclude therefore that welfare is lower when ￿rms collude on advertising rather than
compete.
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. There are two cases to prove. First, I show that ￿
ac < ￿
pc whenever a ￿ v￿t
2 :
Second, I show that ￿
ac < ￿
pc for a > v￿t
2 : The ￿rst case is trivial. From Lemma 3, ￿
pc = 1
for a ￿ v￿t















< 1 8a ￿















: First note that





pc = 1 > ￿
ac: Notice also that ￿
pc (a) > ￿






2at+t2=4: Substituting a =
(v￿2t)(v￿t)









2at+t2=4. It follows therefore that ￿
pc (a) > ￿
ac (a). Second, because both ￿
pc
and ￿
ac are everywhere continuous, if ￿
pc and ￿
ac never cross (intersect) for a 2 (t=2;a),
then it must be the case that ￿
pc lies everywhere above ￿
ac: From the above expressions for
￿
pc and ￿











2at+t2=4 = 0 is a￿ =
v(v￿t)
2t : However,
a￿ > a: Hence, in the interval (t=2;a), ￿
pc and ￿
ac do not intersect. It follows therefore
that, in the interval (t=2;a); ￿
pc > ￿
ac:
Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. Lemma 3 claims that @￿
ac
@a > 0 and @￿
pc
@a < 0 8a: Under collusion on advertising,


























































￿2 > 0 as required. As for price
collusion, ￿pc = v￿t￿a




















(2a+v￿t)3 (v ￿ t ￿ 2a) < 0 since
19a > v￿t
2 : Hence the lemma.
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. Whenever b a exists, the result follows directly from Lemma 3. Hence I only need to





; for some ￿ > 0:21 Notice that for any given ￿; a is con-
strained to the interval (a(￿);a(￿)), where a(￿) = ￿
2v and a(￿) =
(1￿2￿)(1￿￿)
2￿ v: Since (by
Lemma 3) ￿pc (a) is continuous and decreasing in a and ￿ac (a) is continuous and increasing
in a, to show that b a exists, it su¢ ces to show that lima!a(￿)+ ￿pc (a) ￿ lima!a(￿)+ ￿ac (a)





: Substituting ￿v for t; the pro￿t
















2 and ￿pc =
2a((1￿￿)v)
2
(2a+(1￿￿)v)2 for a >
(1￿￿)v














v > ￿(￿ ￿ 1)














: Hence, the relevant part of ￿pc as a ! a(￿) is ￿pc =
(1￿￿)v￿a







































4 v > 0 for ￿ 2 (0;0:365): Since for our purposes ￿ < 1=3;




















v > 08￿ 2











; lima!a(￿)+ ￿pc (a) > lima!a(￿)+ ￿ac (a) and lima!a(￿) ￿pc (a) < lima!a(￿) ￿ac (a):
Hence, ￿pc (a) and ￿ac (a) intersect.
Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. Proposition 5 claims that ￿ac > ￿nc and ￿pc > ￿nc; where ￿pc = v￿t￿a





(2a+v￿t)2 for a > v￿t





2 8a 2 (t=2;a): The ￿rst claim is
covered under Proposition 1. Hence, here I only prove the second claim. The idea of the proof
21The restriction that ￿ < 1=3 is a direct consequence of the full market coverage assumption. Under low
di⁄erentiation, t < v=2; which implies ￿ < 1=2: However, internal consistencies (within the model) impute
further restrictions on ￿: Because a =
(v￿2t)(v￿t)
2t and a also takes values greater than v￿t
2 (see equation
(18)), consistency requires that v￿t
2 < a: Simplifying this inequality gives the upper bound to the ratio t=v:
More precisely, ￿ ￿ t
v < 1=3:








3 > 0 and that ￿pc(a) is continuous and decreasing (Lemma 3). Therefore,




(2a+v￿t)2 for a > v￿t
2 ; evaluating at a =
(v￿2t)(v￿t)
2t gives ￿pc (a) =
t(v￿2t)
v￿t



















￿2 > 0 if and only if 2t ￿ v + 2
p
(v ￿ 2t)(v ￿ t) > 0:
Since
p
(v ￿ 2t)(v ￿ t) > v ￿ 2t; it follows that 2t2 ￿ tv + 2t
p
(v ￿ 2t)(v ￿ t) > 0: Hence,
￿pc (a) > ￿nc (a): I conclude therefore that ￿pc > ￿nc for all a 2 (t=2;a):
Appendix B: Unconstrained Collusive Price and Pro￿ts
As I mentioned before, it is possible (and plausible) that the ￿rms may collude on a "high"
price ￿a price which may induce some consumers not to purchase. The objective of this
appendix is to show that assuming full coverage is not very restrictive and in particular,
that our results are robust.
Suppose then that ￿rms collude on a price that induces some consumers not to purchase.
Then, for such a price, ￿rm i￿ s demand is given by22:
(B1) Di (￿1;￿2;p) = ￿i
￿
1 ￿ ￿j





;i;j = 1;2;j 6= i;
where (v ￿ p)=t < 1 denotes the purchase probability by a consumer who receives the
advertising message from only one of the ￿rms (partially informed). Because ￿rms charge
the same price, the purchase decision of the fully informed consumers is not governed by
prices (as long as the price does not exceed the reservation price). That is, independent of
the price, ￿rms equally split (between them) the population of fully informed consumers.
As before, ￿rms set prices in the ￿rst stage and advertising in the second stage. I start
by solving for the optimal advertising level in the second stage. Given the collusive price, p;
























Di⁄erentiating with respect to ￿i and simplifying gives,
(B3) ￿i =
2pv ￿ 2p2
2at ￿ pt + 2pv ￿ 2p2
In the ￿rst stage, ￿rms choose the collusive price to maximize joint pro￿ts. Their problem
22The demand function in (B1) is valid only when the collusive price exceeds v ￿ t: If the collusive price




























(2at ￿ pt + 2pv ￿ 2p2)
2










Since consumers￿reservation price is v; prices higher than v cannot be optimal. Hence,
p ￿ v: But, can ￿rms collude on the price p = v? The answer is no! At the price p = v; each
￿rm has demand zero and pro￿ts can be increased by lowering the price23. Therefore I rule









Clearly, for p to be an equilibrium, we must have a ￿ v=2: Suppose ￿rst that a = v=2:
Then, p = 2a = v: But, p = v is impossible. Hence, a > v=2: But, if a > v=2; then,
2a +
p
2a(2a ￿ v) > v; and hence cannot be an equilibrium collusive price. This leaves
(B5) ppc
ur = 2a ￿
p
2a(2a ￿ v)
as the collusive price, where the subscript ur stands for unrestricted. Observe that ppc
ur (a)
is decreasing in a:24




8av ￿ 16a2 + (8a ￿ 2v)
p
a(4a ￿ 2v)




Note that lima!1 ppc
ur = v=2: In fact, ppc
ur quickly converges to v=2: For example, for
a = 8v; ppc
ur = 0:50807v: Since lima!v=2 ppc
ur (a) = v and since ppc
ur is decreasing in a and
intersects ppc
r (subscript r stands for restricted (I am abusing notation here) ￿this is the
case studied in the main text), there exists a￿ such that ppc
ur (a￿) ensures that the market is
just fully covered25. That is, the equation 2a ￿
p
2a(2a ￿ v) ￿ (v ￿ t) = 0 has a solution
23Note that because consumers are distributed according to a continuous density, the probability that an
ad sent by ￿rm 1 (￿rm 2) will reach a consumer located at point 0 (1) is zero. Because it is costly to visit












a(2a ￿ v) < 0 if and only if 2
p
2a(2a ￿ v) < (4a ￿ v):






< (4a ￿ v)2 = 16a2 ￿8av+v2;





r intersect follows from the fact that p
pc
ur converges to v=2; together with the condition
for low di⁄erentiation (t < v=2). The condition t < v=2 implies that p
pc













t2 ￿ 2tv + v2￿
Remark 6 ppc
ur > ppc
r for a 2 (v=2;a￿) and ppc
ur < ppc
r for a > a￿: Because limt!0 a￿ = v=2
it follows that limt!0 (ppc
ur ￿ ppc
r ) = 0: That is, when t is small, the restricted collusive price
is close to the unrestricted price. This shows that the full coverage assumption does not
constrain the collusive price "too much".
I next derive the ￿rms￿optimal pro￿ts. The objective is to show that the unrestricted
pro￿ts do not di⁄er much from the "restricted" pro￿ts. As we saw above, for a ￿ a￿; the
collusive price is given by ppc
ur = 2a ￿
p
























I claim that; For a > a￿; ￿pc = ppc
r D(￿
pc














This is the case studied in section 4.
Observe that for a > a￿; ppc
ur < ppc
r and the market is covered. If the ￿rm charges the
collusive price ppc

















2 =2: Since the market is covered and ppc
ur < ppc
r ; it follows that ￿fullcov
ur is strictly








2 : Hence, for a > a￿; ￿rms cannot collude on
price ppc




not optimal. At this price, the optimal advertising level is given by ￿
pc
r : It follows therefore









2 : Hence the claim.
To summarize, let (with some abuse of notation), ￿pc denote the optimal collusive pro￿ts
when there are no a priori restrictions on the collusive price. Then, ￿pc = ￿pc
ur for a 2
(v=2;a￿) and ￿pc = ￿pc
r for a > a￿.
Remark 7 a￿ ￿ v=2 = t
2
2(v￿2t): We see that when t is small, the range of a over which
￿pc
ur is relevant is very "narrow" and moreover, this range diminishes as t converges to zero.
Hence, when t is small, ￿pc
ur is largely irrelevant and ￿pc ￿ ￿pc
r : That is, when t is small,
assuming full coverage is not very restrictive.
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25Author￿ s Appendix
8 When will ￿rms compete for the fully informed consumers?
In the main text, I assumed that ￿rms compete for the fully informed consumers. Here,
I provide a necessary condition for ￿rms to compete for the fully informed consumers [the
existence of a symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies].
Each ￿rm has two choices ￿to compete for the fully informed consumers or to sell only to
its captive consumers. When ￿rms compete for the fully informed consumers, in equilibrium,






; where superscript c stands for competition.
What if ￿rm 1; for instance, deviates from the symmetric equilibrium and opts to serve
only its partially informed consumers? In that case, since di⁄erentiation is low, ￿rm 1 will
advertise the price pm = v ￿ t so that it extracts all the consumer surplus of the (partially
informed) consumer who travels the farthest distance. In equilibrium, ￿rm 1 faces the
demand Dm = ￿(1 ￿ ￿) and its pro￿t is given by ￿m = (v ￿ t)￿(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ a￿
2=2; where
superscript m stands for monopoly. Substituting for the equilibrium advertising level (7), I
get:












For given v and t; ￿rm 1 will compete for the fully informed consumers, rather than
serve only its captive consumers if and only if ￿c ￿ ￿m: However, ￿c ￿ ￿m if and only if




￿ 0. Solving for a gives;
(20) a￿
1 = (v ￿ t)
￿
v ￿ 3t ￿
p




2 = (v ￿ t)
￿
v ￿ 3t +
p
(v ￿ 5t)(v ￿ t)
￿
=4t
For a < a￿
1; ￿rms earn higher pro￿ts when they both serve all informed consumers.
Intuitively, when the advertising cost is "low" (a 2 (t=2;a￿
1)), the advertising intensity
will be high. A higher advertising intensity implies that the majority of consumers are
fully informed about the advertised prices, i.e., they have seen advertising from both ￿rms.
Because the majority of consumers have seen advertising from both ￿rms, it follows that
the market composed only of the partially informed consumers is "too thin". Consequently,
￿rms ￿nd it pro￿table to compete for the fully informed consumers. For a 2 (a￿
1;a￿
2), the
advertising levels are not high, which implies that not many consumers receive advertising
messages from both ￿rms. Because fewer consumers are fully informed, the o⁄setting bene￿t
from competing for the fully informed consumers (market size) is small.26 On the other hand,
selling only to the captive consumers allows the ￿rm to charge the monopoly price. Since
the share of fully informed consumers is relatively small, the demand loss from ignoring the
fully informed consumer segment is small. Hence, for a 2 (a￿
1;a￿
2); at least one ￿rm ￿nds it
pro￿table to "defect" and only serve its partially informed consumers.27
26Remember that competition for the fully informed consumers leads to lower prices.
27In the asymmetric equilibrium, when ￿rm i; for instance, defects and only serve its captive consumers,
26For a > a￿
2; the advertising levels are low, but the equilibrium price when ￿rms compete
for the fully informed consumers is high (
@p
@a > 0). Thus, although fewer consumers receive
advertising from both ￿rms, the price applicable to this group is not very di⁄erent from the
monopoly price. As a result, it pays to compete for the fully informed consumers. Hence,
for a > a￿
2; ￿rms ￿nd it pro￿table to compete for the fully informed consumers.
To summarize (see Figure 2. above), a symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies exists for
a 2 (t=2;a￿
1) and for a > a￿
2: For a 2 (a￿
1;a￿
2); a symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies does
not exist. Firms have incentives to defect from the symmetric equilibrium when a 2 (a￿
1;a￿
2):
it charges price p = v ￿ t for the advertised good while the other ￿rm, ￿rm j; charges price v ￿ 2t. This
price, v ￿ 2t; ensures that the fully informed consumer who travels the farthest distance (unit interval) is
just indi⁄erent between buying from ￿rm i at price v ￿ t and buying from ￿rm j:
27